the uniform statute, adopted by Alabama without, apparently, a thought, flips the law of *in rem* property on its centuries-old head. There can be no greater property right in English common law than the requirement that private property may not be seized by the government or anyone else without due process of law. In this very context, that means notice, a claim compliant with the rules of civil procedure and common law, adequate time to conduct discovery, prepare a defense, and engage in motion practice, and a trial, with attendant rights to appeal – in short, a separate action for the current owner of the property to defend that ownership against claims of fraud. One flippant phrase in subsection (b) cannot undo those ancient property rights.[9]

In any event, the court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the motion because Plaintiffs' motion does not fall under any of the provisions of Rule 60. Alternatively, if Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration could be construed as a "motion for relief from a court order" within the meaning of Rule 60 or a "motion for relief" within the meaning of Rule 62.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil

[9] Adding to the confusion is the former difference in proceedings at law, as here (obtaining a money judgment), and equity (the traditional vehicle to resolve property title issues). The distinctions between law and equity have technically been abolished in Alabama law. *See* Ala. Rule Civ. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action known as the 'civil action.'"); *Poston v. Gaddis*, 335 So. 2d 165, 167 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) ("With the adoption of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, the common law forms of actions at law and in equity were abolished. Actions and defenses of a legal and equitable nature may now be joined and intermingled in the one form of 'Civil Action.'"). Nevertheless ancient cases establish procedures that apply to levy and execution despite modern uniform acts.